Routine human behavior has often been attributed to plans-mental representations of sequences goals and actions-but can also be attributed to more opportunistic interactions of mind and a structured environment. This study asks whether performance on a task traditionally analyzed in terms of plans can be better understood from a "situated" (or "embodied") perspective. A saccade-contingent displayupdating paradigm is used to change the environment by adding, deleting, and moving task-relevant objects without participants' direct awareness. Response latencies, action patterns, and eye movements all indicate that performance is guided not by plans stored in memory but by a control routine bound to objects as needed by perception and selective attention. The results have implications for interpreting everyday task performance and particular neuropsychological deficits.
Much of our life's activity consists of relatively orderly routines, such as getting ready in the morning, preparing breakfast, driving, cleaning the house, etc. Such routines represent skilled behavior in the sense that they have been shaped by repeated performance of the task but may still involve parameters that change from one instance to the next. In terms of Anderson's (1995) theory of learning, we would say they correspond to the associative stage, in which one operation has come to fairly directly trigger the next. Early approaches to analyzing such behavior focused on the possibility that it was guided by rich internal representations, such as plans specifying a series of goals to achieve or actions to take (e.g., Ernst & Newell, 1969; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Newell & Simon, 1972) , and less on the possibility that it was guided in large part by processes like perception and attention that are less centrally cognitive. This emphasis on internal representations may have been a reaction to the neglect of such constructs during the behaviorist era but was in any case propelled by the digital computer as a metaphor for human information processing, which allowed mental representations and processes to be codified in precise terms and then simulated. Plans in particular could be represented as programs and then executed to prove their functional sufficiency to accomplish some complex task. Such demonstrations often made use of puzzle tasks that, like the Tower of Hanoi, require some kind of mental search through a space of possible solution paths, the results of which are then useful to store in memory to guide actual task performance. Such tasks also often have a simple apparatus that does not change dynamically on its own, such that adequate "world models" can be built directly into the system, circumventing the need to model processes like perception and attention that would ordinarily construct representations of the world from perceptual inputs.
Under the influence of the computer metaphor, the plan-based approach to analyzing routine behavior may have overestimated the power of central cognitive processes, while at the same time underestimating the power of peripheral processes to guide behavior using information extracted from the environment. Such is the view of the situated (or embedded) approach that evolved in response, which proposes that routine or otherwise orderly behavior can emerge from interactions between organism and environment that foster opportunism at the process level (Agre & Chapman, 1987; Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997; Clark, 1997; Glenberg, 1997; Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006; Suchman, 1987) . For example, the behavior of a robot driving to a table to pick up a can of soda can be characterized in terms of a driving process producing a physical proximity to the table, with this proximity in turn triggering a reach for the can (Brooks, 1991) . In other words, although the driving and reaching processes in some sense communicate, they do so indirectly through the environment, rather than directly through internal channels using shared internal representations.
The situated approach also proposes that internal representations are generally simple and sparse. For example, Agre and Chapman (1987) developed a software agent that played the arcade game Pengi, controlling a virtual penguin whose task was to chase and attack virtual bees in a maze of obstacles. The penguin's internal representations were "indexical," meaning they represented objects in relation to the agent's body, and "functional," meaning that they pointed only to elements that were directly relevant to the agent's activity. For example, a "bee-that-I'm-attacking" index, which was kept locked to a particular bee by the perceptual system, identified the current object of the penguin's activity. A few such representations, carefully chosen, allowed the penguin to exhibit what seemed like goal-directed behavior without much of a world model and without any kind of planning system.
The situated approach has not yet been applied to the kinds of tasks for which the plan-based approach seems ideally suited: those with complex rules that seem to require searching a space of solution paths, but with a simple and static environment, such that plans encoded during the search are useful for guiding behavior during actual performance. In this study, we ask whether the situated approach can actually improve on plan-based models of (human) performance in one canonical planning task, the Tower of Hanoi puzzle. If so, this might indicate a need to reevaluate the mechanisms of "planful" behavior more broadly.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the puzzle and the two most current cognitive models, both of which assume that behavior is guided by some kind of plan stored in memory. We then describe our own selective-attention model and its perceptual and attentional mechanisms (a computational simulation of which is presented in the Appendix). We then present three experiments that test contrasting predictions of the plan-based and selective-attention models, using a saccadecontingent display-updating procedure that allows us to change the world-meaning, here, the puzzle display-while the system is functionally blind and thereby probe the nature of the representations guiding behavior. In the General Discussion, we reassess evidence previously offered in support of a plan-based account of Tower of Hanoi performance and examine implications of our work for interpreting everyday tasks as well as neuropsychological impairments assessed with this and similar puzzle tasks.
The Tower of Hanoi Task and Current Models
A sample Tower of Hanoi problem is shown in Figure 1a . There are three pegs holding sets of disks of different sizes. In the initial state of the puzzle, the disks are typically arranged as here in a pyramid on one of the pegs, and in the final state, the disks are typically arranged in a pyramid on a different peg. The task is to transform the initial state to the final state by moving disks from peg to peg, subject to the rules that (a) only one disk can be moved at a time, (b) a larger disk cannot be placed on a smaller one, and (c) a disk can only be moved if it is the top disk on a peg.
One way to approach solving the puzzle is to use the goalrecursive algorithm for planning a given move. For the problem state shown in Figure 1a , this algorithm would apply as follows. To move the tower from Peg A to Peg C (the overall goal), the largest disk must be moved to Peg C, but this move cannot be made yet because it is "blocked" by the other disks sitting on top of the largest disk. Thus, the goal to move the largest disk must be suspended. The system then recurses, setting itself the goal to move the second-largest disk out of the way to Peg B to allow the largest disk to be moved. The second-largest disk also cannot be moved yet, so the system recurses again to the next "blocking" disk, and so on, until it reaches the smallest disk on the tower and moves that to Peg C, which at that point represents "out of the way" for moving the second-smallest disk. There are other ways to solve the puzzle (e.g., Simon, 1975) , and studies of how people acquire strategies to solve this task leave participants to discover an algorithm on their own (e.g., Anzai & Simon, 1979) . However, in studies that examine performance on this task once it has become routinized, the goal-recursive algorithm is often simply taught to participants to reduce strategic variability (e.g., Anderson, Kushmerick, & Lebiere, 1993) , which is also the approach we take here.
Current models of routinized performance on this task (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Anderson & Douglass, 2001 ) assign two distinct functional roles to the goal-recursive algorithm. The first is to compute where to move the disk at the top of a tower, as described above. The second is to encode a plan in memory representing the Figure 1 . The goal-recursive algorithm in the Tower of Hanoi puzzle. a: The rule applied to the initial state of a five-disk problem. The final state is for the tower to be on Peg C. The arrows indicate intended disk movements. Arrows, disk labels, and peg labels were not on the problem display shown to participants. b: Example saccadic eye movements during application of the rule. Arrows indicate saccades and dots indicate fixations and were, again, not shown to participants. c: The mental representation generated by the goal-recursive algorithm according to the ordered-goals model, at the point where the recursion has reached Disk 1. Goals are ordered by recency, with the current goal on top and the oldest goal on the bottom. sequence of goals generated by the algorithm as it executes. This plan then guides processing on later trials. Figure 1c shows the plan encoded by the goal-recursive algorithm as it applies in Figure 1a . The plan would then guide subsequent moves as follows: Once the first move is made (Disk 1 to Peg C), the suspended goal to move Disk 2 to Peg B would be retrieved, and this move would then be made, because it can be at that point. After that, the suspended goal to move Disk 3 to Peg C would be retrieved. This goal cannot be achieved at this point (because Disk 1 is on Peg C), but it still guides behavior in that it triggers a new application of the goal-recursive algorithm, which starts with the goal to move Disk 3 to Peg C (and generates, as the next move at that point, Disk 1 from Peg C to Peg B). The number of goals stored in the plan thus fluctuates, with goals removed as they are achieved and added whenever the goal-recursive algorithm executes; the maximum number of goals in the plan at any point corresponds to the number of disks in the problem.
The two plan-based models we examine here both assume that goals are encoded in memory and retrieved to guide behavior but differ in their assumptions about how information about goal sequencing is represented. What we refer to as the ordered-goals model of Anderson and Douglass (2001) assumes that goals are ordered internally in a sequential representation that corresponds to the order in which they need to be retrieved to guide behavior along the optimal solution path. In contrast, what we refer to as the primed-goals model of Altmann and Trafton (2002) assumes that the retrieval cue for a goal is the disk coded in that goal and that heuristics guide the system to attend to the correct disk in the puzzle display at the correct time to cue retrieval of the correct goal. The primed-goals model constitutes a shift from internal to external representations of goal-sequencing information and thus a step on the path to the hypothesis of the present study but preserves the key assumption that goals are encoded in memory by the goal-recursive algorithm and then retrieved later to guide behavior. Thus, both the ordered-goals and primed-goals models assume that performance on this task is "planful," meaning guided by plans stored explicitly in memory.
In the selective-attention model we discuss next, we assign only one functional role to the goal-recursive algorithm, which is to compute where to move the disk at the top of the tower; the algorithm encodes no plan in memory to guide future processing.
The Selective-Attention Model
We assume that routinized performance on the Tower of Hanoi-after initial learning, once people have basically figured out how to solve each new problem they are given-draws less on memory representations and more on perceptual and attentional operations than the plan-based models we discussed above. The main perceptual operation is to recognize a tower of disks when it has been newly assembled. This new tower is then bound to an attentional pointer or index that functions like the FINST construct proposed by Pylyshyn and colleagues (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2000) . A FINST binds a parameter of a conceptual representation to an object in the environment. Results of multiple-object tracking studies suggest that there are four or five FINSTs available for concurrent and independent use. In our case, the relevant conceptual representation is an abstract control routine that governs performance on the Tower of Hanoi task. The routine is abstract in that it has parameters that have to be bound to specific objects for it to execute. When it does execute, it directs actions that change the world so as to trigger a new round of parameter bindings and thus another round of execution. The routine is triggered by recognition of a new tower, then takes another step in disassembling an old tower, then invokes the goal-recursive algorithm on the new tower to compute the next move. The basic memory representations from which the model draws are thus attentional indexes that track external objects: a newly recognized tower, an old tower that is being disassembled, and a disk displaced from the latter to which to transfer the former. We elaborate on these mechanisms in the following sections and in the Appendix.
Recognizing a Tower
We assume that, after participants have learned to perform the task, they are able to recognize towers of disks as objects relevant to performance. There is behavioral evidence for such tower recognition (Ruiz & Newell, 1989) , and our experience with the task suggests that towers are highly salient, given that performance involves continually assembling new towers in the course of disassembling old ones.
We define a tower operationally as a set of two or more disks on a peg in which the smallest is Disk 1 and in which disks differ by only one step in size. Figure 2 shows two different towers that meet this definition. In Figure 2a , the tower on Peg C comprises all three disks. In Figure 2b , the tower on Peg C comprises Disks 1 and 2 only, given that Disks 2 and 5 differ by more than one step in size; this jump breaks continuity in the Gestalt sense, which we take as a perceptual basis for the system to limit the extent of the recognized tower. We take tower recognition to be a bottom-up perceptual operation triggered whenever a tower is completedthat is, when Disk 1 is placed on top.
The new tower is relevant because it becomes the input to the goal-recursive algorithm, which computes how to move it to another peg. The system therefore points to the new tower with a new-tower index, which is updated when a new tower is recognized. In terms of the arcade-game example we mentioned earlier (Agre & Chapman, 1987) , updating the new-tower index is similar to updating the penguin's "bee-that-I'm-attacking" index to point to a new bee after the old bee has been successfully attacked. Unlike the old bee, however, the old tower may still be relevant, if it has not yet been fully disassembled. Therefore, the system also points to the old tower with an old-tower index.
The Recognize-Displace-Compute Routine
The assembly and disassembly of towers of disks are related functionally in a way that causes them to be interleaved behaviorally, and we assume that after initial learning, the system has acquired a control routine that manages this interleaving in conjunction with environmental triggers. Specifically, we assume that recognizing a new tower triggers a move to "displace" another disk from a tower that is being disassembled and that this displacement triggers a new application of the goal-recursive algorithm. The algorithm computes the correct move for Disk 1, given the goal to transfer the new tower as a whole to the displaced disk. In functional terms, what this routine accomplishes is to displace a disk from the old tower and add it to the new tower from under-neath, in a sense, which then opens up another peg to displace yet another disk from the old tower and thus make progress toward fully disassembling the old tower as part of reconstructing it on another peg. (We make no assumptions about whether participants represent the functional effect of this routine; they could also learn it simply by generalizing over action sequences during initial experience with the task.) The displaced disk plays a central role in this sequence, and to represent this role, the system points to it with a just-displaced-disk index.
To illustrate these various constructs, Figure 2a shows a new tower, signified by the box, and a just-displaced disk, signified by the oval. In the state one move prior to the state shown there, Disk 4 was on Peg A, Peg B was empty, and Disk 1 had just been moved to Peg C, completing the new tower. Disk 4 was then displaced from Peg A to Peg B to become the just-displaced disk. The next step is for the goal-recursive algorithm to compute the correct next move for Disk 1, which is to move it from Peg C to Peg B.
To illustrate by analogy to another situated system, earlier, we mentioned Brooks's (1991) example of a robot that drives toward a table, at which point the proximity of the table triggers a reach for the soda can on the table. The role of proximity in triggering the reach there is analogous to the role of recognition of a new tower triggering further disassembly of the old tower. In both cases, control passes from one procedural step to another through the environment, with the first step changing the world in a way that triggers the second.
An incidental assumption not central to our hypothesis (see the Appendix) is that after the move indicated by recognize-displacecompute, the next two moves are guided by heuristics that we carry over from previous models. The first moves Disk 2 to the other peg (an instantiation of the "don't-undo" heuristic; Altmann & Trafton, 2002; VanLehn, 1991) , and the second moves Disk 1 on top of Disk 2 (the "1-follows-2" heuristic of Altmann & Trafton, 2002) . This three-move sequence (which Karat, 1982 , interpreted basically as a procedural chunk) transfers Disks 1 and 2 of the new tower (which may be the whole tower) to another peg. For example, in Figure 2a , Disks 1 and 2 would be transferred from Peg C to Peg A.
The Empty Peg
We assume that the perceptual and attentional operations described above determine what task-relevant objects are selected for attention during routine performance on this task, implying that other objects on the puzzle display are not selected for attention, including, specifically, large disks that have not been processed recently. When such a disk is the top disk on a peg, we take it to be ignored, as if the peg is physically empty (holds no disks at all). An empty peg plays an important role in performance, in that it is the destination for a disk being displaced from the old tower.
The state in Figure 2a resulted from displacing Disk 4 to Peg B, which at that point was physically empty. In contrast, the state in Figure 2b resulted from displacing Disk 3 to Peg A, which at that point held Disk 6, but Disk 6 was not part of the new tower (Disks 1 and 2 on Peg C) or the old tower being disassembled at that point (Disks 3 and 4 on Peg B), so was not selected for attention. Thus, Peg A was effectively empty.
Overview of Experiments
In three experiments, we tested whether performance on the Tower of Hanoi is guided by plans-sets of move-specific goals formulated ahead of time, stored in memory, and retrieved to guide behavior-or by an abstract control routine bound opportunistically to specific objects in the environment. The basic method was to alter the puzzle display "invisibly" during performance such that information extracted from the changed display would lead to one behavior, whereas a goal retrieved from memory-and encoded from the prechange displaywould lead to a different behavior. We changed the display during saccades, when the visual system is functionally blind (e.g., Li & Matin, 1997; O'Regan, 1992) , so as to mask the visual transients that would ordinarily trigger direct awareness of environmental changes.
In all three experiments, participants were shown the goalrecursive algorithm and allowed to practice with it, then performed three target problems for which we collected data. The first and third target problems were control problems, and the second was Figure 2 . Problem states used to illustrate the recognize-displace-compute routine. a: Two moves ago, the system placed Disk 1 on Peg C to complete a new tower (marked by the box). One move ago, the system displaced Disk 4 from the old tower on Peg A, which is currently being disassembled, to the empty Peg B. The goal-recursive algorithm starts with the goal to move Disk 3 of the new tower to the just-displaced disk (marked by the oval) and identifies the correct next move as Disk 1 to Peg B. b: Two moves ago, the system placed Disk 1 on Peg C to complete a new tower (marked by the box). One move ago, the system displaced Disk 3 from the old tower on Peg B, which is currently being disassembled, to the subjectively empty Peg A. The goal-recursive algorithm starts with the goal to move Disk 2 of the new tower to the just-displaced disk (marked by the oval) and identifies the correct next move as Disk 1 to Peg B. the critical problem, in which we made saccade-contingent display changes. In all three problems, the disks were arranged in a single tower on one peg in the initial state and on a different peg in the final state, with the initial and final pegs differing between problems.
In Experiment 1, the changes in the critical problem involved adding a disk to the initial tower and then exchanging disks later in the problem, such that the participant started a five-disk problem and finished a six-disk problem with the same final state. In Experiment 2, the change was to delete two disks from the initial tower in the critical problem, such that the participant started a seven-disk problem and finished a five-disk problem. In Experiment 3, the change was to perform the correct move for the participant at a particular intermediate state of the critical problem. In each case, we created a "treadmill" of routine behavior and manipulated the environment to see what was guiding it: goals stored in memory representing the old environment, or a control routine bound as needed with details from the current environment.
Experiment 1: Disk Addition Followed by Disk Exchange
In Experiment 1, the initial state of the critical problem contained five disks, as in the sample problem shown in Figure 1 . Between Moves 2 and 3 we added a disk to the top of the initial tower. Figure 3 shows the problem state before and after the addition (see Figures 3a and 3b, respectively) . The new disk, labeled 3a (although not on the participant's display), was added as the participant made a saccade from Disk 2 to Disk 1 to pick up Disk 1 and place it on Disk 2. To preserve uniform size differences between all disks, Disk 3a was made the original size of Disk 2, and Disks 1 and 2 were slightly shrunk. The visual transients resulting from all these changes occurred during a saccade, so should not have been perceived.
Later in the problem, between Moves 10 and 11, we exchanged the positions of Disks 3 and 3a. The aim was to preserve the original final state of the problem, which we thought participants might remember. Figure 3 shows the problem state before and after the exchange (see Figures 3c and 3d, respectively) . The exchange occurred as the participant made the saccade from Disk 2 to Disk 1 to pick up Disk 1 and place it on Disk 2. Perceptually, the effect of the exchange is subtle, but its effect is to reverse the direction of Move 12, as we describe in the following.
Diagnostic Moves
We aim to discriminate empirically between the ordered-goals, primed-goals, and selective-attention models by comparing their predictions for which moves should show increased response latencies in the critical problem compared with the control problems. The order-goals model predicts increases on Moves 12, 16, and possibly 4; the primed-goals model predicts an increase on Move 4; and the selective-attention model predicts an increase on Move 12. In the following, we consider Moves 4, 12, and 16 in detail.
Move 4. We illustrate Move 4 of the critical problem in context of Figure 3 . The problem state shown in Figure 3b is the one immediately preceding Move 3, which transfers Disk 1 from Peg C to Peg B, creating a two-disk tower on Peg B and leaving Figure 3 . Saccade-contingent display changes in the critical problem of Experiment 1. In this instance of the critical problem, the initial tower was on Peg A, and the instruction was to move it from there to Peg C. a: The problem state after Move 2, which is 2AB (transfer Disk 2 from Peg A to Peg B). The display changes that follow are to add Disk 3a and shrink Disks 1 and 2. b: The problem state immediately after these changes. Move 3 is 1CB, and Move 4 is 3aAC. c: The problem state after Move 10, which is 2CA. The display change that follows is to exchange Disks 3 and 3a. d: The problem state immediately after these changes. Move 11 is 1BA, and Move 12 is 3aBC. Peg C empty. Move 4 is then 3aAC-that is, it transfers Disk 3a from Peg A to Peg C.
To derive predictions for the ordered-goals model, we needed to ask what information might be coded in goals. Anderson and Douglass (2001) did not commit to specific details at this level, which were not relevant to their behavioral tests, so their model is, for our purposes, incomplete. Our approach to filling in the missing details was to assume two different sets that seemed reasonable and test the implications of each. We cannot rule out the possibility that other reasonable assumptions make different predictions.
One possibility is that a goal codes the to-be-moved disk and its destination peg. This disk-to-peg coding predicts a latency increase on Move 4 in the critical problem (relative to Move 4 in the control problem). The current goal at this point is 3C-that is, to move Disk 3 to Peg C. After the display change, this goal cannot be directly achieved, because Disk 3 is now covered by Disk 3a (see Figure 3b) . Thus, latency on Move 4 should reflect time for the system to compute how to achieve 3C. In the control problem, in contrast, 3C can be directly achieved at this point, because Disk 3 is the top disk on Peg A (see Figure 3a) .
The other possibility is that a goal codes the source and destination pegs for a move. This peg-to-peg coding predicts no latency increase on Move 4. The current goal at this point is AC-that is, to move the top disk on Peg A to Peg C. With this goal, the system can simply move Disk 3a as it would have moved Disk 3. We focus on the peg-to-peg coding on later diagnostic moves.
The primed-goals model also predicts a latency increase on Move 4, because any goal retrieved at this point should not be directly achievable. According to this model, the system should focus on the most recently uncovered disk at this point, using the disk itself as a cue to retrieve a goal indicating where that disk should be moved. Disk 3 was most recently uncovered, during Move 2. However, Disk 3 is now covered again, by Disk 3a, so if the retrieved goal is relevant to Disk 3, response latency should reflect time to compute (using goal-recursion) how to move Disk 3a out of the way. If, instead, the system simply focuses on the top disk of the relevant tower and uses that as the retrieval cue, it should focus on Disk 3a-which is identical to the original Disk 2, so should retrieve 2B, the original goal for Disk 2. This again cannot be directly achieved, because Peg B holds smaller disks, so response latency should again reflect goal-recursion time. Alternatively, if the system were to detect that 2B had been retrieved once before and achieved, this should trigger time-consuming processing that would not be triggered on this move in the control problems. Thus, various interpretations of the primed-goals model all predict a latency increase on Move 4.
The selective-attention model predicts no latency increase on Move 4, because there is no conflict between the external and internal problem representations. There is now a new two-disk tower on Peg B, which was created by Move 3, and recognition of this new tower should lead the system to displace another disk from the old tower, which is on Peg A, to the empty peg.
Move 12. We illustrate Move 12 of the critical problem in context of Figure 3d . The state shown there is between Moves 10 and 11, immediately after the saccade-contingent exchange of Disks 3 and 3a. Move 11 is 1BA, and Move 12 is 3aBC.
The peg-to-peg ordered-goals model predicts a latency increase on Move 12 in the critical problem, because the goal at that point is not achievable. The goal at that point, which would have been formulated during goal-recursion on Move 9 before the exchange of Disks 3 and 3a, is CB. Now, after the exchange, CB cannot be directly achieved, because the disk on Peg C is larger than the disk on Peg B. Therefore, this model suggests that we may see illegal move attempts at this point, if the system does not represent disk sizes, but in any case we should see a latency increase as the system contends with the fact that it cannot achieve its current goal.
The selective-attention model also predicts a latency increase on Move 12. Move 11 completes a new two-disk tower on Peg A, which the system should recognize, triggering a displace operation that moves a disk from the old tower, which is on Peg C, to Peg B. After the exchange, this move is illegal, so Move 12 should reflect time to contend with this inconsistency.
Move 16. The problem states immediately prior to Move 16, which vary by problem type, are shown in Figure 4 . The state in the critical problem is shown in Figure 4a , and the state in the control problem is shown in Figure 4b .
The peg-to-peg form of the ordered-goals model, under a key assumption, predicts a latency increase on this move in the critical problem because the current goal is not achievable. The assumption, which we address in more detail in the Discussion, is that the system is following the plan it formulated earlier, before we added Disk 3a. Under this assumption, the goal at this point is AC; this would have been formulated during goal-recursion on Move 1. In the critical problem, AC cannot be directly achieved, because Peg C holds smaller disks that are blocking it. Thus, move latency in the critical problem should reflect time to compute how to move this tower. In the control problem, AC can be directly achieved, because Peg C is empty.
The selective-attention model predicts no latency increase in the critical problem, because there is no conflict between the external and internal problem representations. The previous move completed a new tower, on Peg C in the critical problem and on Peg B in the control problem, which should lead the system to displace another disk from the old tower, which is on Peg A in both problems (the old tower consists of Disks 4 and 5 in the critical problem and Disks 5 and 6 in the control problem). The system should attend to the top disk on Peg A and move it to the empty peg (Peg B in the critical problem and Peg C in the control problem).
Summary. An effect of problem type (critical, control) on response latency for Move 12, but not on response latency for Moves 4 and 16, would support the selective-attention model, and would be evidence against both forms of the ordered-goals model and the primed-goals model.
Diagnostic Eye Movements
The selective-attention and plan-based models make different predictions for where participants should look in particular problem states, on the assumption that people generally look at objects they are processing (e.g., Rayner & Liversedge, 2004) . Figure 5 shows a sample state (the same in both panels) and predicted eye movements for the two models. The state is the one produced by Move 4AB, which is Move 8 in a six-disk problem in which all disks are on Peg A in the initial state and Peg B in the final state. According to the selective-attention model, Disk 4 is the justdisplaced-disk, Peg A holds the old tower, and Peg C holds the new tower. The system should next apply the goal-recursive algorithm to the new tower, so should fixate next in the vicinity of Peg C. According to the plan-based models, Move 4AB achieved a goal, and when a goal is achieved the next operation is to retrieve the next goal from the plan to see if that is also achievable (and, if not, compute how to achieve it). The next goal is 5C, or AC in peg-to-peg format, so the system should fixate next in the vicinity of Peg A. For the primed-goals model, this is a strong prediction, because attending to Disk 5 is necessary to prime retrieval of the associated goal. In the ordered-goals model, the prediction is weaker in that it rests on the assumption we noted earlier that people generally look at objects they are processing.
Three states in each problem (both control and critical) were good candidates for this analysis, namely those following Moves 4, 8, and 16. In each case, the hypothetical new tower rests on a different peg than the disk associated with the hypothetical to-beretrieved goal, so fixations could be reliably coded as supporting one model or the other. The relevant fixations were coded by assessing for each one whether it fell in the region occupied by a peg.
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight undergraduate students from the Michigan State University psychology subject pool participated in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Given the small number of observations per participant-one per move for the critical problem, two per move for the control problems-we handled errors by excluding participants. An error was a move that deviated from the optimal solution path. A participant was included if he or she made no errors on diagnostic moves in the control problems and no more than two errors on the combined set of 58 nondiagnostic moves from the first 32 moves of the control problems (these 32 moves are the ones we examine in the Results and Discussion section). Twenty-two participants met this accuracy criterion.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in sessions lasting about an hour. The participant first read a description of the rules governing moves in the Tower of Hanoi puzzle: that only one disk could be moved at a time, that a disk could not be placed on a disk that was smaller than it, and that a disk could not be moved if there was another disk on top of it. The participant was then given a four-disk problem and asked to explore it. The participant was allowed to finish it on his or her own if he or she could; if the participant became stuck the experimenter intervened to help. The experimenter then presented a new five-disk problem and demonstrated the correct move sequence to solve it, describing the goal-recursive algorithm in the process. The goal-recursive algo- Figure 5 . Predicted eye movements for the selective-attention and plan-based models. In both panels (which show the same state), the previous move was 4AB (Disk 4 moved from Peg A to Peg B). a: Under the selective-attention model, Disk 4 is the just-displaced disk, and the newly assembled tower is on Peg C, so the eyes should move next to the vicinity of Peg C. b: Under plan-based models, 4AB achieves a goal, and the next goal is 5C or AC, so the eyes should move next to the vicinity of Peg A. rithm was described in the following terms (gestures are noted in brackets):
If you need to move the pyramid to Peg C, then the largest disk [points to Disk 5] should go there first. So formulate the goal to move this disk onto this peg [points to Peg C] . At the moment, the goal cannot be achieved, because this disk is blocked by other disks [circles the blocking disks, which are Disks 1, 2, 3, and 4]. Find the largest blocking disk, which is Disk 4, and formulate the goal to move this disk out of the way to the peg that differs from the destination peg of the largest disk [points to Disk 5] . Check if you can execute the move. Repeat these steps until you find a move that can be executed.
The participant was then given four practice problems, consisting of two six-disk problems, a five-disk problem, and another six-disk problem. The pegs for the initial and final towers varied across problems. The experimenter provided help as needed during this phase.
The three target problems were then presented: the first control problem (six disks), the critical problem in which saccadecontingent display changes were made (initially five disks), and the second control problem (six disks). The pegs for the initial and final towers differed across problems, with the order counterbalanced across participants. The location for the final tower was indicated at the start of a problem with an instruction to "Please transfer the tower onto the third peg," for example. The experimenter intervened to correct errors during this phase.
Participants moved a disk by clicking it with the mouse, dragging it over the destination peg, and releasing the mouse, at which point the disk fell into place. Response latency for a move was timed from release of the previous disk (or, for Move 1, from the onset of the problem) to release of the disk currently being moved. If the participant attempted an illegal move by trying to place a larger disk on to a smaller disk, the larger disk dropped onto the peg, but fell to the lowest level on the peg, overlapping with the disk that was already there. If an illegal move was made during the target problems, the experimenter intervened to correct it.
Pegs were separated by 9°of visual angle; the first and the third pegs were 4.2°of visual angle from the left and the right edges of the display, respectively. The centers of two adjacent disks residing on a peg were 1.7°of visual angle from each other. Participants were seated at a viewing distance of 82 cm from the computer display.
Apparatus. Eye movements were monitored by an SR Research EyeLink II eye-tracker sampling at 500 Hz. Viewing was binocular, but only the right eye was monitored. Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled by SR Research Experiment Builder software. The eye-tracker and display monitor were interfaced with a 3-GHz Pentium 4 PC, which controlled the experiment and logged the position of the eye throughout all trials.
Results and Discussion
One participant was excluded from the data for Move 4, and a different participant was excluded from the data for Move 16, in both cases because their latency was more than two standard deviations from the mean for that move in the critical problem (for Move 4, M ϭ 2.1 s, SD ϭ 1.9 s, outlier ϭ 10.3 s; for Move 16, M ϭ 3.4 s, SD ϭ 4.8 s, outlier ϭ 24.2 s). The outcomes of the inferential tests we describe below did not change if these participants were included. Figure 6 shows response latencies for the first 32 of the 63 moves of the target problems. The solid line represents the critical problem and the dashed line represents the average of the two control problems. The pattern in Figure 6 , with latency spikes of varying heights on Moves 1, 5, 9, . . . is consistent with results from previous studies of the Tower of Hanoi (e.g., Anderson et al., 1993) . The latency spikes reflect application of the goal-recursive algorithm, with the height of a spike proportional to the number of disks in the tower to which the algorithm is applied. Figure 1b shows an example of eye movements on one such move. This pattern, in which the eyes move from one disk of a tower to its goal destination, then to the next disk up and its goal destination, and so on, offers converging evidence for use of goal recursion on such moves. We also note that, on remaining moves (those other than 1, 5, 9, . . .), which are fast enough to suggest they require relatively little "thinking," participants first fixated the source peg for the move and then the destination peg for the move in 76% of cases. This high proportion is consistent with findings suggesting that eye movements in everyday tasks, such as making coffee or preparing a sandwich, are closely associated with the steps of routinized performance as it unfolds (Land & Hayhoe, 2001) .
For each of the diagnostic moves we discussed above-Moves 4, 12, and 16 -we compared latency on the critical problem with average latency for the two control problems. On Move 4, latency in the critical problem (M ϭ 1.70 s, SD ϭ 0.54 s) was not reliably faster than latency in the control problems (M ϭ 1.60 s, SD ϭ 0.53 s), t(21) ϭ 0.88, p ϭ .39. On Move 16, latency in the critical problem (M ϭ 2.38 s, SD ϭ 1.29 s) also was not reliably faster than latency in the control problems (M ϭ 2.19 s, SD ϭ 0.86 s), t(21) ϭ 0.54, p ϭ .60. On Move 12, latency in the critical problem (M ϭ 5.23 s, SD ϭ 5.77 s) was substantially slower than latency in the control problems (M ϭ 1.16 s, SD ϭ 0.37 s), t(22) ϭ 3.3, p Ͻ .01. We also note that among nondiagnostic moves, Move 1 was faster in the critical problem because that problem started with one fewer disk, which reduces the number of recursions of the goal-recursive algorithm, and on Move 17, the trend was for latency to be faster in the critical problem, but the effect was not reliable.
The pattern of results on diagnostic moves supports the selective-attention model, which predicted a latency difference only on Move 12. The pattern conflicts with the disk-to-peg form of the ordered goals model and with the primed-goals model, which both predicted a latency difference on Move 4. The pattern also conflicts with the peg-to-peg form of the ordered-goals model, which predicted a difference on Move 16 -under an assumption we noted earlier, that on this move the system is guided by the same goals it formulated before we added Disk 3a to the problem. If, instead, the system reanalyzed the problem, by applying the goal-recursive algorithm to all six disks, the new plan would specify the correct goal for Move 16 (AB, as in the control problem) and thus predict no latency increase. Reanalysis did not seem to occur on Moves 4 -11 or 13-15, where latencies did not differ from the control problem. It probably also did not occur on Move 12, where latency was still somewhat faster than Move 1 latency on control problems (see Figure 6 ), which estimates the time needed to recurse over six disks. Nonetheless, to the extent that participants could have reanalyzed the problem, the case against the peg-to-peg model is weakened, and we develop a stronger test in Experiment 3.
The moves that participants actually made are consistent with the latency data. On Move 4, the disk-to-peg ordered-goals model and the primed-goals model both predict that the current goal should have been 3C. In the critical problem, this goal should have triggered goal-recursion to compute how to achieve 3C, which should have led to 1CA as the actual move (the relevant state is the one in Figure 3b after 1CB is made). Instead, all participants made the move predicted by the selective-attention model, which is 3aAC. Eye movements also suggest that there was no intention to achieve 3C. Had participants intended to move Disk 3, they should have fixated on Disk 3, which was the second disk from the top at that point in the critical problem. Instead, participants typically focused on the top disk (3a). By two-tailed sign test, there was no effect of problem type (critical, first control) on the frequency of fixations on the top-most disk of the tower at that point in the problem ( p ϭ .22). Participants were not less likely to fixate the top disk (3a) in the critical problem than the top disk (3) in the first control problem.
Associated with the latency increase on Move 12 was a high rate of illegal move attempts in which the participant picked up Disk 3 and tried to place it on Peg B, even though Peg B already held Disk 3a, which was smaller (the relevant state is the one in Figure 3d after 1BA is made). Thirteen of 22 participants (59%) attempted this move. In each case, the experimenter intervened once the participant had released Disk 3 on Peg B, after which the participant returned Disk 3 to Peg C, and then, of his or her own accord, made the correct move, which was 3aBC. (The time taken up by the illegal move attempt and the resulting intervention were not included in the latency data for Move 12. When an illegal move was attempted, we started timing the subsequent legal move from release of Disk 3 on Peg C, which was the action that undid the illegal move attempt.) Eye movements suggest that four additional participants (18%) intended to perform the illegal move, because they fixated on Disk 3 before fixating on and moving Disk 3a. (As we noted earlier, participants usually fixate a disk before they move it. On Move 12 in the control problems, for example, participants fixated the to-be-moved disk in 91% of cases.) This high proportion of illegal move attempts and intentions (77% combined) suggests that disk size was not a particularly salient feature of participants' representations of the problem-even though disk size was a relevant task constraint-and that other information was largely guiding move selection.
We also examined latency for illegal move attempts in the critical problem, timed from release of Disk 1 on Peg A to release of Disk 3a on Peg B, to assess whether participants may have hesitated before trying to make this move. Latency for the illegal move attempt (M ϭ 1.59 s, SD ϭ 0.92 s) was not reliably higher than latency on Move 12 in the control problems (M ϭ 1.36 s, SD ϭ 0.4), t(12) ϭ 1.22, p ϭ .25. Thus, there was no evidence to suggest that participants detected a problem with the move before they tried to make it.
The eye-movement data also support the selective-attention model and not plan-based models. As we described earlier, the selective-attention model predicts that the eyes should move from the just-displaced disk to the peg holding the new tower, whereas plan-based models predict that the eyes should move from the just-displaced disk to the peg associated with the next goal to retrieve-and in some states, these pegs are different (see Figure 5 ). Out of 198 observations (three for each of three problems for each of 22 participants), 91% were consistent with the selective-attention model, and 9% were consistent with a goal guiding the next step of processing. This evidence is especially problematic for the primed-goals model, which makes the strong prediction that the relevant disk has to be attended to cue retrieval of the associated goal. This evidence is also problematic for the order-goals model under the assumption that the system fixates the disk or peg it is thinking about at the moment.
To evaluate the extent to which participants were explicitly aware of any discrepancies between the puzzle display and their representation of it after the changes in the critical problem, the experimenter asked them a structured series of questions at the end of the session (5-7 min after the changes occurred). First, the participant was asked a general question as to whether he or she noticed anything unusual. Second, the participant was told that something had changed on the display during one of the problems and was asked if he or she had noticed. Finally, the participant was told what had changed on the display and when and was asked if he or she had noticed. The answers indicate that no participants were aware of the display changes in the critical problem and that none noticed the change in number of disks during the critical problem, from five to six. Moreover, the 13 participants who tried to make an illegal move on Move 12 viewed this error as their own mistake and did not attribute it to any external changes.
One specific behavioral episode also bears on the question of participants' awareness of our display changes. On Move 4 of the critical problem, one participant reported to the experimenter that he had made an error and asked if he could undo his steps. (The software did not allow undoing of multiple steps, so the problem was terminated soon after and the participant's data excluded.) He had not made an error, but he had reanalyzed the problem using goal recursion, as indicated by his eye movements, which would have suggested that he had made an error-on Move 1, by moving Disk 1 to the wrong peg for what was now a six-disk problem. He had also reanalyzed the problem state on Move 4 in the preceding control problem, suggesting that reanalysis was a strategic choice of some kind, and that reanalysis drove the "error" detection, not the other way around. Thus, in this one case the effect of the display change was in some sense detected, but not perceptually, and then not correctly attributed.
In sum, performance on the critical problem was basically the same as on the control problem-except for Move 12, on which latencies were several times longer in the critical problem (5.2 s, compared with 1.2 s; see Figure 6 ). This effect on Move 12 was predicted by the selective-attention model but also by the peg-topeg form of the ordered-goals model. The disk-to-peg form of the order-goals model and the primed-goals model predicted effects on Move 4, for which there was no behavioral evidence. The peg-topeg form of the ordered-goals model predicted an effect on Move 16, on the assumption that participants did not reanalyze the full problem state after we added the new disk. Finally, the high proportion of illegal move attempts (59%) on Move 12, after we exchanged locations of two disks, suggests that disk size was not saliently coded in participants' internal representations.
Experiment 2: Deletion of Two Disks
Experiment 1 suggested that plans stored in memory were not guiding behavior, but it also differed from an important prior study in a way that could limit its generality. In the materials used by Anderson and Douglass (2001) , disks and pegs were labeled on the problem display with letters and numbers, in addition to varying in terms of visuospatial characteristics (size and location) as they did here. These verbal labels represented an alternative source of information that participants could have made use of to code goals in memory. If use of plans is under strategic control, this availability of this extra information could have made a plan-based strategy more attractive. Thus, in Experiment 2, we labeled the disks and pegs.
We also altered the manipulation in the critical problem to focus on another hypothesis that seems to arise from plan-based models, which is that the system will detect and react to a discrepancy between the number of internal object representations and the number of external object referents. Such a discrepancy occurred in the critical problem we used in Experiment 1, but here we sought to enhance it. Instead of adding one disk, we deleted two disks, turning a seven-disk problem into a five-disk problem. This should lead to intermediate states in which, according to planbased models, there are more goals represented internally than there are disks to which they are relevant; the maximum ratio of goals to disks is 3 to 1, which would seem to be a salient discrepancy. The hypothesis that the system will detect such discrepancies may be less direct a consequence of plan-based representations than predictions linking goals to specific moves, which we tested in Experiment 1 and test again here, but it nonetheless represents a converging operation. If performance reflects neither the information in specific goals nor discrepancies between the number of goals and the number of objects to which they refer, this would strengthen the case that goals are simply not represented.
Finally, the saccade-contingent changes we make here are more dramatic than they were in Experiment 1. Here we changed the height of the initial tower by two disks instead of one within the first few moves and changed the locations of several disks concurrently with each disk deletion. These more extensive changes should help test the limits of our procedure in terms of what saccade-contingent changes will go unnoticed by participants. In general, the more that one can manipulate in a problem display without leading to immediate awareness of the manipulation, the greater the power of the procedure to create discrepancies between internal and external representations useful for elucidating what those internal representations are.
We used letters to label the disks and numbers to label the pegs, as shown in Figure 7 . We used letters for disks instead of numbers to discourage participants from thinking about disks in numeric terms, hoping to prevent participants from discovering a heuristic, based on the parity of the number of disks in a tower, that can substitute for the goal-recursive algorithm.
There were two sets of saccade-contingent display changes in the critical problem. First, between Moves 2 and 3, we shortened the initial tower by one disk. To do this without introducing a gap in the size ordering of the remaining disks, we deleted the smallest disk on the display, then moved the second smallest disk into its old position, then moved the third smallest disk into the old position of the second. Figure 7 shows the problem state before and after these changes. In Figure 7b , which shows the state after the change, Disk P has been deleted from Peg 3, Disk K has replaced it, and Disk E has replaced Disk K on Peg 2. These changes occurred as the participant made the saccade from Disk K to Disk P to pick up Disk P and place it on Disk K. The second set of changes, which used the same method to shorten the initial tower by a second disk, occurred between Moves 4 and 5. Figure 7 shows the problem state before and after these changes (see Figures 7c and 7d , respectively), which were triggered when the participant made the saccade from Disk T to Peg 2 to compute where to move the two-disk tower located there. This second disk deletion served to preserve the original final state of the problem, as the exchange of two disk locations did in Experiment 1.
Diagnostic Moves
The disk-to-peg form of the ordered-goals model and the primed-goals model predict a latency increase on Move 4 in the critical problem; the peg-to-peg form of the ordered-goals model predicts latency increases on Moves 9 and 16 in the critical problem; and the selective-attention model predicts no latency increases in the critical problem. In the following, we consider these moves and model predictions in detail.
Move 4. We illustrate Move 4 in the critical problem in terms of Figure 7 . The problem state shown in Figure 7b is the one immediately preceding Move 3, which transfers Disk K from Peg 3 to Peg 2, creating a two-disk tower on Peg 2 and leaving Peg 3 empty. Move 4 then transfers Disk T from Peg 1 to Peg 3.
The predictions for Move 4 correspond to those in Experiment 1, although here the manipulation should be somewhat stronger because there are additional display changes. As in Experiment 1, the ordered-goals model predicts a latency increase on Move 4 under the assumption that a goal codes the to-be-moved disk and its destination peg. Under this assumption, the current goal at this point is E3 (i.e., to move Disk E to Peg 3). After the display changes in the critical problem, this goal cannot be directly achieved, because Disk E is now covered by Disk K, so latency on this move should reflect time for the system to use goal recursion to compute how to achieve the current goal. Moreover, unlike in Experiment 1, Disk E is now on a different peg than it was when the goal was encoded (Peg 2 instead of Peg 1). Thus, if the goal representation includes any information about the original location of the to-be-moved disk, such as a peg label or spatial information, this would also be in conflict with the external problem state, contributing separately to an increase in latency, if only by triggering visual search to find Disk E.
The primed-goals model also predicts a latency increase on Move 4, because any goal primed for retrieval at this point should not be directly achievable. The retrieval cue should either be Disk E, which was most recently uncovered but is now to be found on a different peg, or Disk T, which is the top disk on the relevant tower. The goal for Disk E cannot be directly achieved because Disk E is covered by Disk K. The goal for Disk T, which should be T2, cannot be directly achieved because Peg 2 holds smaller disks. Whichever goal is retrieved, then, should trigger goal recursion that adds to response latency.
The selective-attention model predicts no latency increase on Move 4, because there is no conflict between the external and internal problem representations. There is now a new two-disk tower on Peg 2, which was created by Move 3, and recognition of this new tower should lead the system to displace another disk from the old tower, which is on Peg 1, to the empty peg.
Moves 9 and 16. The problem states immediately prior to Moves 9 and 16 are shown in Figure 8 . Move 9, shown in Figure 8a , transfers Disk E from Peg 3 to Peg 2. Move 16, shown in Figure 8b , transfers Disk I from Peg 1 to Peg 3.
The peg-to-peg form of the ordered-goals model predicts a latency increase on both moves, under the assumption that participants are able to detect substantial discrepancies between the number of goals represented internally and the number of relevant objects in the environment. On both moves only one disk remains of the initial tower (Disk I), and if the internal representation were aligned with this state then only one goal should remain (Goal 13). Instead, these states occur at points in the critical problem at which there should be three goals referring to the initial tower. This 3:1 ratio of goals to disks was higher than the maximum 2:1 ratio of goals to disks that occurred in Experiment 1, and we supposed that it would offer a reasonable test of whether this kind of representation discrepancy would be detected. In case detection interacted for some reason with whether or not the current goal is directly achievable, the two moves offer a useful distinction, in that Goal Figure 7 . Saccade-contingent display changes in the critical problem in Experiment 2. In this instance of the critical problem, the initial tower was on Peg A, and the instruction was to move the tower to Peg C. a: The problem state after Move 2, which is K12 (transfer Disk K from Peg 1 to Peg 2). The display changes that follow are to delete Disk P and move Disks E and K. b: The problem state immediately after these changes. c: The problem state after Move 4, which is T13. The display changes that follow are to delete Disk K and move Disks E, T, and D. d: The problem state immediately after these changes. Figure 8b ) but not on Move 9.
is achievable on Move 16 (this is the move shown in

Method
Participants. Thirty-five undergraduate students from the Michigan State University psychology subject pool participated in exchange for course credit. None had participated in Experiment 1. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. A participant was included in the analysis if he or she made no errors on diagnostic moves in the control problems and no more than two errors on the combined set of 26 nondiagnostic moves from the first 16 moves of the control problems (these 16 are the moves we examine in the Results and Discussion section). Twenty participants met this criterion.
Apparatus and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1 except that (a) at the start of the session, the experimenter referred to the disks and pegs by their verbal labels in addition to using referential gestures, in describing the goalrecursive algorithm; and (b) the saccade-contingent display change involved transforming the critical problem from a seven-disk puzzle into a five-disk puzzle, as described previously.
Results and Discussion
Two participants were excluded from the data for Move 4, in both cases because their latency was more than two standard deviations from the mean for that move in the critical problem (M ϭ 3.0 s, SD ϭ 4.4 s, outliers ϭ 18.8 s and 12.0 s). The outcomes of the inferential tests we describe below did not change if these participants were included. Figure 9 shows response latencies for the remaining participants for the first 16 moves of the target problems. The solid line represents the critical problem and the dashed line represents the average of the two control problems. On the three diagnostic moves, latencies were not reliably affected by problem type (critical, control), t(17) ϭ 1.37, p ϭ .19 for Move 4, t(19) Ͻ 1 for Move 9, and t(19) ϭ 1.43, p ϭ .17 for Move 16; on all three moves, the trend was for latency to be faster in the critical problem than in the control problem.
The moves that participants actually performed are consistent with the latency data. On Move 4, the disk-to-peg ordered-goals model predicts that the current goal should have been E3. In the critical problem, this goal should have triggered goal recursion that ultimately led to the next move being K21 (the relevant state is the one in Figure 7b after K32 is made). Instead, all participants made the correct next move, which was T13. The primed-goals model also predicts K21, based on either of the two goals that could be primed for retrieval at this point, which are E3 and T2.
To evaluate the extent to which participants were aware of representational discrepancies stemming from the saccadecontingent display changes, which were more substantial here than in Experiment 1, we asked the same debriefing questions we did in Experiment 1. The answers of nine of the 20 participants (45%) indicated that they had not noticed the display changes. Seven of the 20 participants (35%) reported, in response to the first question, about whether they had noticed anything unusual, that the overall height of a tower had become shorter. Four of the 20 participants (20%) reported that disks had been deleted; two of these four reported this in response to the first question and the other two in response to the third question, when they had been told what had changed and when.
The two-disk change in height of the initial tower was quite salient perceptually, at least to an observer who knew it happened, so it may not be surprising that some participants were able to identify it. However, the change in height was not the only clue that something had changed about the problem; another was that the critical problem took much less time to solve than it should have as the seven-disk problem it started as-31 moves, compared with 127 moves. To the extent that participants had expectations for problem duration based on the number of disks in the initial state, these would have been violated. Indeed, two participants made time-related comments during the debriefing. One of the nine who did not seem to notice any changes reported that either the problems were getting easier or she was getting better, and one of the five who reported noticing the disk deletions noted that a problem did not take as long as she thought it should have. In the latter case in particular, a violation of temporal expectancy could then have supported an inference that something had changed on the problem display.
None of the 20 participants gave any indication of having noticed that the disks had moved around during the display changes, even though both disk size and disk labels were available as cues to this change. This extends the finding from Experiment 1 that participants did not seem to code disk size in their representations of the problem state (as reflected in the large number of illegal move attempts on Move 12). It may be that in general, features that discriminate among disks are not paid much attention, an issue to which we return in Experiment 3.
In sum, performance on the critical and control problems was basically the same, on all moves (see Figure 9 ). As in Experiment 1, this conflicts with predictions based on what the current goal should have been, had goals been directing behavior. The disk-topeg form of the ordered-goals model and the primed-goals model predicted a latency increase and an error on Move 4. There was no evidence for a latency increase, except for two outliers, and there were no errors. In this experiment we also asked whether a discrepancy between the number of internal goals and the number of external referents would be detected. The discrepancy would have been greatest on Moves 9 and 12 of the critical problem, but there was no latency increase relative to the control problem in either case. Finally, we saw no evidence that verbal labels for disks and pegs facilitated use of a plan-based strategy, or even that these labels were encoded in participants' representations.
Experiment 3: Making a Move on the Participant's Behalf
In Experiment 3 we contrast the selective-attention model with the peg-to-peg form of the ordered-goals model, in which we assume that a goal codes the source and destination pegs for a move, but no information about the to-be-moved disk. This model could accommodate the results of Experiment 1 under the assumption that people formulated new goals after the display change, and the results of Experiment 2 under the assumption that the system does not detect discrepancies between the number of goals represented internally and the number of disks on the puzzle display. Here we implement a different kind of display change, in which we make a move on the participant's behalf, and ask what move the participant makes next.
We also further examine what details about the problem state are coded in participants' problem representations. Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that neither disk size nor disk labels were coded.
Here, we ask about the height of a disk on a peg. The move we make on the participant's behalf empties the location in space that that disk had been occupying. If the height of that location is not coded, we would expect the next lower disk on that peg to be easily accepted as a "replacement" for the disk that we moved, with little evidence that participants notice the difference. This would support our assumption that attention can be allocated to a tower without being allocated specifically to its constituent disks.
The move we make for participants is illustrated in Figure 10 . (The critical problem in this experiment involved six disks; in the representative problem that is the basis for Figure 10 , the initial tower would have been on Peg A and the final tower on Peg C.) The software moves Disk 3 from Peg C, as located in Figure 10a , to Peg A, as located in Figure 10d . This is Move 20 of the problem and occurs in two stages, as the participant makes Move 19. Figure 10a shows the problem state before Move 19, which is 1AB. As the participant saccades to Peg A to pick up Disk 1, the software deletes Disk 3 from Peg C, as shown in Figure 10b . The participant then places Disk 1 on Peg B, creating the state in Figure  10c . As the participant then saccades away from Peg B, Disk 3 appears on Peg A, as shown in Figure 10d . We moved Disk 3 in two stages like this to avoid changing the target of the saccade that triggers the change, so as to reduce the likelihood that participants would detect the change (Henderson & Hollingworth, 2003) .
Diagnostic Move
There is one diagnostic move in this experiment, which is Move 21, immediately following the display change. In context of Figure  10d , the correct move at this point-the one that keeps the system on the optimal solution path-is 1BC.
The main diagnostic measure here is not latency but the move actually made. For the peg-to-peg model, the goal is CA, to move the top disk from Peg C to Peg A. Peg C holds Disk 4, and Peg A holds Disk 3 (see Figure 10d ), so this move is illegal, but participants may try it anyway, if they did not code the height of Disk 3 on Peg C before we moved it and now try to move the disk underneath it. Following any such illegal move attempts, the move actually made will depend on whether the system reanalyzes the problem to formulate a new plan. If so, we would expect the correct move, 1BC. If not, such that the model retains Goal CA from before the display change, the next move should be 1BA, the first step of a sequence that clears Disk 3 from Peg A (1BA, 2BC, 1AC, 3AB, 1CA, 2CB, and 1AB). However, because 1BA undoes 1AB, which was the participant's last move, it might be discouraged by the "don't-undo" heuristic.
The selective-attention model predicts, qualitatively, that the system will recognize the two-disk tower on Peg B (see Figure  10d ) and then want to perform the displace step of the recognizedisplace-compute routine. The tower currently being disassembled is on Peg C, so the system may try to displace Disk 4 from Peg C to Peg A. Thus, as under the peg-to-peg model, participants may try to make the illegal Move 4CA, assuming, again, that they did not code the height of Disk 3 on Peg C. Following any such illegal move attempts, the move actually made will again depend on whether the system reanalyzes the problem. If so, we would expect the correct Move 1BC. If not, the system might first perform a more limited reanalysis to try to bind the displace operation to a disk that can be legally moved. Disk 3 is the only candidate, as Disk 1 never belongs to an old tower, so this limited reanalysis would predict instances of the error Move 3AC. There would be no obvious explanation of 3AC in terms of the peg-to-peg model.
Method
Participants. Thirty undergraduate students from the Michigan State University psychology subject pool participated in exchange for course credit. None had participated in the previous experiments. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. A participant was included in the analysis if he or she made no errors on Moves 17-24 in the control problems. Twenty-two participants met this criterion.
Apparatus and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1 except that (a) the critical problem was a six-disk puzzle, and (b) the saccade-contingent display change involved making a move on the participant's behalf, as described above.
Results and Discussion
The state after the display change in the critical problem is shown in Figure 10d . From this state, 10 of 22 participants (45%) tried to make the illegal Move 4CA. Latency for the attempt, timed through release of Disk 4 on Peg A (after which the experimenter intervened) was about as long (M ϭ 2.0 s, SD ϭ 1.5 s) as latency for Move 21 in the control problem for these participants (M ϭ 1.8 s, SD ϭ 0.9 s), t(9) ϭ 0.38, p ϭ .72. Thus, there was no hesitation to try to move Disk 4 in place of Disk 3. In these cases, then, participants seem not to have coded the height, or any other details, of Disk 3. These illegal move attempts do not distinguish between models, in that the system could have been trying either to achieve Goal CA or to displace Disk 4.
In terms of the move actually made (after any illegal move attempts), no participant made the error Move 1BA, but 13 of 22 participants (59%) made the error Move 3AC (six of these after first trying the illegal move). Move 3AC was predicted by our analysis above suggesting that, once the system found it could not displace Disk 4, it would bind the displace operation to Disk 3, the only other candidate for a "displaceable" disk at this point. Thus, these moves seem to have a unique interpretation in terms of the selective-attention model.
The moves made after the error Move 3AC are also illuminating. In four of the 13 cases, the participant undid the error and then made the correct Move 1BC-but in the remaining nine, the participant continued by transferring the two-disk tower on Peg B (see Figure 10d) to Disk 3 on Peg C. This sequence is consistent with the selective-attention model if Move 3AC had been the effect of a displace operation, as we suggested previously. That is, we would say that these nine participants recognized the new two-disk tower on Peg B, found a disk to displace (Disk 3 instead of Disk 4), then moved the new tower to the just-displaced disk, all in accord with the recognize-displace-compute routine. The effect of this sequence was to recreate a problem state from earlier in the trial, before the display change. From this recreated state, all nine participants made the same moves they had earlier, triggering a second instance of the display change. Six then made the correct Move 1BC, but three made the loop a second time. At a general level, apart from the specifics of the selective-attention model, this looping behavior seems consistent with a situated view in that performance was strongly guided by the environmental changes we introduced and apparently not so strongly by memory for moves or states of even a moment ago.
All participants ultimately made the correct Move 1BC, but only five of 22 made it directly, without intervening illegal-move attempts (4CA) or errors (3AC). Latency in these five cases was substantially greater (M ϭ 10.2 s, SD ϭ 4.6 s) than it was for Move 21 in the control problem for these participants (M ϭ 1.5 s, SD ϭ 0.9 s), t(4) ϭ 4.5, p ϭ .01. This latency increase may have reflected reanalysis of the problem after the display change, which was necessary to identify the correct move. At almost 9 s, the increase may have been large enough to reflect mental simulation of the missteps that other participants made physically, in which case the trigger for reanalysis in all cases may have been this kind of search through the problem space.
In sum, after the display change, many participants (45%) tried to make an illegal move, indicating they had not coded the height of the disk we moved on their behalf and simply tried to move the disk underneath. These illegal move attempts could have been guided by a peg-to-peg goal or by an operation to displace a disk from an old tower. For the first legal move after the display change, most participants (59%) made an error move that we interpret in terms of the system finding a way to bind the displace operation after the original binding failed.
General Discussion
Traditional research on routine behavior has often appealed to complex internal representations such as plans (e.g., Ernst & Newell, 1969; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) and has tested such accounts using tasks for which plans seem ideally suited: those with complex rules but simple, static environments. The Tower of Hanoi is a canonical example, and current models of performance on this task assume it is guided by goal structures (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Anderson & Douglass, 2001 ). Our results indicate that the orderly nature of routine performance on this task results not from plans, and suggest instead that processing is guided by a structured environment triggering the operation of simple, abstract rules whose parameters are bound through perception and attention.
In the following, we first summarize our evidence on plan-based models and revisit some previous evidence offered in their favor to try to reconcile the conflict. We then summarize our evidence on the selective-attention model. Finally, we explore implications of our results for everyday task performance and for neuropsychological deficits traditionally interpreted in terms of goal-directed functioning.
Evidence Concerning Plan-Based Models
The evidence from our three experiments suggests that there is little if any role for move-specific goals in governing performance in this task environment. Perhaps the most direct evidence concerning move-specific goals comes from the situations we created in which what should have been the current goal predicted behavior that we did not observe. In Experiments 1 and 2, we created situations in which the current goal would have been achievable in the control problems but not in the critical problem. This in turn should have led to higher response latency on that move in the critical problem, as the system used goal recursion to compute how to achieve the goal. With one exception, we saw no such increases. The one exception was Move 12 of Experiment 1 (see Figure 6 ), but here the latency increase was also anticipated under the selective-attention model. Moreover, in all these situations, as well as in Experiment 3, move-specific goals predicted moves that participants did not actually make. An important caveat on this analysis is that to test the ordered-goals model in particular, we had to make assumptions about what information is coded in goals, going beyond the level of detail at which the model was previously specified (Anderson & Douglass, 2001 ). Although we tested two sets of assumptions, leading to the disk-to-peg and peg-to-peg forms of the model, there may be others that maintain the basic functionality of goals but also accommodate the present empirical results.
A second line of evidence is an apparent lack of specific disk-related information coded in participants' representation of the problem state. In Experiment 1, on a move after a display change, most participants tried to move a wrong-sized disk illegally without hesitation, continuing the move to the point where they dropped a larger disk on a smaller disk. In Experiment 2, we moved several disks around during a saccade at two points in the critical problem, with no effect on response latencies in either case. Here the disks were also labeled, suggesting that participants did not code label information either. In Experiment 3, many participants again tried to make an illegal move, even though the disk they selected to move was both larger and in a different location than the disk they would have selected had we not moved it for them. Given that neither the size of a disk, nor any labels, nor the location of a disk seem to be salient enough to prevent a disk from being inappropriately selected for moving, it is unclear how the system could make any use of goals that hypothetically code disk-specific information. This argument applies to goals that code disks and thus does not apply to the peg-to-peg form of the ordered-goals model.
A third line of evidence is the absence of any effect of discrepancies between the number of goals that the system should have been maintaining, in some sense, and the number of objects in the task environment to which those goals were relevant. In Experiment 2, we created situations in which the ratio should have been 3:1, yet there was no effect on response latency. This evidence is indirect in the sense that it rests on assumptions about the nature and operation of discrepancy-detection mechanisms. In Experiment 3, however, we learned that participants were ultimately able to detect when a move (3CA) led them back to an old problem state and make the correct move instead. Thus, as part of a larger pattern, the absence of evidence that participants detected an excess of goals seems easiest to explain in terms of an absence of goals.
Other studies have offered evidence for goals in the Tower of Hanoi, which we try here to reconcile with our results. Anderson and Douglass (2001) reported higher response latency at a point in the problem where a goal hypothetically had to be retrieved, compared with a point at which no goal had to be retrieved. In their procedure, participants performed two types of actions: moves, as in our procedure, and goal-posting actions, with which participants registered a goal with the experiment software as they formulated it. Anderson and Douglass compared latencies for two different goal-posting actions. In the first case, a goal referring to Disk 3 was posted immediately after a goal referring to Disk 4 had been posted (their "Under 4" category). In the second case, a goal referring to Disk 3 was posted immediately after a goal for Disk 5 hypothetically had been retrieved from memory (the retrieval subcategory of their "Under 5" category); this goal would not have been achievable at this point and therefore would have triggered the goal-recursive algorithm. Response latency was higher in the second case, which Anderson and Douglass took as evidence of time to retrieve the goal for Disk 5. However, this effect could have been due to other operations required to set up the goalrecursive algorithm. In our model, these would have included attending to the newly recognized tower after displacing a disk, and finding its largest disk. Such operations would have been included in the second case, where timing started on the previous move (the displace step), but not in the first case, where timing started with the previous goal posted during application of the goal-recursive algorithm.
Evidence Concerning the Selective-Attention Model
We characterize performance in this task environment in terms of an abstract control routine with parameters bound by perceptual and attentional operations. In each of our experiments, for a set of diagnostic moves, we identified how the parameters of the routine would be bound-which new tower had been recognized, which old tower was being disassembled, and which disk was or would be displaced-and how execution of the routine accounted for the data. Two moves are of particular interest. For Move 12 of Experiment 1, we created a situation in which the top disk of the old tower could not legally be displaced after the display change. We observed increased latency and a large proportion of illegal move attempts, consistent with difficulties executing the displace operation. For Move 21 of Experiment 3, we created a similar situation by making Move 20 on the participant's behalf, which again led to a large proportion of illegal move attempts. The illegal move attempts in both situations could have been guided by peg-to-peg goals as well as displace operations. However, in Experiment 3, the move that participants actually made after the display change (and after any illegal move attempts) was most often an error that suggested the system had found a way to bind the parameters of the displace operation. This move was often followed by the three-move sequence that the recognize-displace-compute routine would predict had that move been the effect of a displace operation.
With respect to the level of detail coded in people's representations of objects in the environment, we found little evidence that these include features that discriminate among disks within a tower. In Experiment 3, for example, participants often took Disk 4 on the lowest level of a peg as a substitute for Disk 3 one level up, which was the disk we had moved on their behalf. This suggests that disk size and disk height were not coded in those participants' representations of the problem state. Similarly, in Experiment 2, the sizes and labels of several disks were affected by the display changes, but this seemed not to affect the performance of any participants. These observations are consistent with the idea that people are able to link an abstract task-relevant concept (e.g., the just-displaced disk) to the associated object in the environment through an index or pointer, rather than coding the object itself (Pylyshyn, 2000) .
Implications for Everyday Tasks
The Tower of Hanoi is only one task environment, but the idea of planless action execution might apply more broadly-for example, to everyday activities, such as preparing coffee or packing a lunchbox. In such tasks, a given action, instead of being linked to the previous action in an internal representation, could again be triggered by perception of the effects of the preceding action. For example, the act of adding creamer could be triggered by the sight of black coffee in a cup, much as a robot's reach for a soda can could be triggered by its proximity to the table on which the can is resting (Brooks, 1991) .
The everyday behavior of nonhuman organisms is often interpreted in such situated terms. For example, the stickleback fish, to reproduce, migrates to shallow water, where it selects territory, builds a nest, fights other males, and mates with a female. This complex behavior might appear to be purposeful or intentional, as if the fish is carrying out one or more plans all linked to the goal of reproducing. And yet, each act is triggered by some environmental condition: Migration is triggered by a change in length of the day, fights are triggered by another male's presence, nest building can be taken up where it was left off because one step cues the next. What is noteworthy about this example is that it was raised by planning theorists (Miller et al., 1960) , who wrote, "It is almost as if the Plan were not in the organism alone, but in the total constellation of organism and environment together" (p. 78). They used this example to illustrate what they saw as a contrast with the planfulness of human behavior. The evidence we have presented suggests that this contrast can be in the eye of the analyst. Even in a task environment in which planfulness has particularly high face validity, plans do not necessarily guide behavior.
Contemporary models of everyday behavior characterize it to some extent in situated terms. For example, in Cooper and Shallice's (2000) model, environmental constraints are built into the preconditions of action schemas. For example, the "pick-up" schema is triggered only when there is an object suitable for picking up and a free hand available to perform the action. To the extent that this and related models (Botvinick & Plaut, 2004 ; see also Cooper & Shallice, 2006) do assume rich internal representations, we note that they are constrained mainly by patient performance on everyday tasks (e.g., Schwartz, Reed, Montgomery, Palmer, & Mayer, 1991; Humphreys & Forde, 1999) , which, as we argue in the following, can be ambiguous as to what the underlying deficits are. The saccade-contingent method we used here, to probe internal representations by manipulating their hypothetical referents in the world, seems to offer a more precise method for constraining such models with behavioral data.
Tasks like the Tower of Hanoi and making coffee are perhaps more amenable than others to a perception-driven analysis because of their visual-spatial nature, raising the question of whether similar principles or analysis could be applied to more abstract tasks. Landy and Goldstone (2007) recently demonstrated that perceptual characteristics influenced mathematical reasoning, which, much like Tower of Hanoi performance, has conventionally been interpreted in terms of purely abstract or syntactic operations. The basic result was that experimental manipulation of notational form and of physical spacing and alphabetic similarity of algebraic variables affected the order in which algebraic operations were applied. In a similar vein, we would say that mathematical notations occur in the physical world and that understanding how they are perceived and attended is central to understanding how they are processed generally. Thus, for example, long division might involve an attentional index binding the concept of "divisor" to the numbers below the division sign. Similarly, algebraic manipulations might involve perception of movements of symbols, such that correct updating of indexes makes the difference between correct steps and errors. These ideas are speculations but flow from our conception of the selective-attention model and should help to frame future experimental work.
One qualification on our results is that they characterize performance only after an initial learning stage, which, for a relatively complex task like this, might be the place to look for evidence of problem solving and thus of goal-based processing. However, it may be that, even during initial learning, the representations guiding performance are abstract in similar ways to the control routine that we suggest is the product of learning. In particular, during exploratory learning, which seems to occur in the Tower of Hanoi as suggested by protocol evidence (Anzai & Simon, 1979; VanLehn, 1991) , the system acts on the world and learns by observing the results, in a sense using perceptual and attentional operations to bind the parameters of a learning process. In terms of an everyday task, it may be easier to cook from a new recipe, for example, if memory for the order of steps is represented externally as a spatial arrangement of ingredients on the table, perhaps with a utensil like a knife used as a pointer for place-keeping (Kirsh, 1995) . This external "scaffolding" may then be absorbed into the control routine that is learned, with spatial cues continuing to mediate the associative relationship between one step and the next. Thus, although our results directly characterize only the routinized performance that follows initial learning, the architectural constraints we tested here seem to be relevant more generally, suggesting that initial symbolic learning processes may themselves be situated in important ways.
Implications for Neuropsychology
The Tower of Hanoi is widely used in the assessment of frontal lobe function. It has been administered to a variety of clinical populations, such as people with Huntington's disease (e.g., Robins Wahlin, Lundin, & Dear, 2007) , schizophrenia (e.g., Rushe et al., 1999) , traumatic head injury (e.g., Vakil, Gordon, Birnstok, Aberbuch, & Groswasser, 2001) , obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Cavedini, Cisima, Riboldi, D'Annucci, & Bellodi, 2001) , autism (e.g., Bolte & Poustka, 2006) , aphasia (e.g., Glosser & Goodglass, 1990) , cerebellar atrophy (Grafman et al., 1992) , amnesia (e.g., Xu & Corkin, 2001) , and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (e.g., Aman, Roberts, & Pennington, 1998) . The task has also been used to study aging (e.g., Head, Raz, Gunning-Dixon, Williamson, & Acker, 2002) . This inventory includes only studies using the Tower of Hanoi, excluding those using the similar Tower of London puzzle (e.g., Shallice, 1982) . The procedure for administering the Tower of Hanoi can vary considerably across studies, complicating any comparative analysis, but perhaps the most relevant procedural variable for our purposes is the amount of practice each participant received on the task, which bears on whether performance is routinized and thus falls within the scope of our model. Across the studies cited above, the number of trials per participant ranged from one to 30, with a median of eight, with eight being the number of trials each of our participants performed. Thus, on the issue of practice, the external validity of our results is not grossly undermined.
The usual approach in clinical studies is to interpret Tower of Hanoi performance as an index of the ability to perform high-level computations like goal recursion. Goel and Grafman (1995) took a different approach, proposing that performance deficits in patients were linked not to difficulty with such computations but to difficulty managing conflicts between different goals stored in memory. On the basis of our results, we suggest that performance deficits in patients may not be linked to difficulty managing goal conflicts either but, instead, to deficits in elementary processes like selective attention. Goel and Grafman (1995) observed that a counterintuitive backward move on the solution path predicted patients' failure to solve the problem and, on the basis of this observation, proposed that participants have difficulty inhibiting the global goal-the location of the tower in the final state of a problem-in favor of the local goal governing the next move. The idea was that the necessary inhibitory ability is similar to that needed to inhibit the prepotent response in the antisaccade task or to inhibit word reading in favor of color naming in the Stroop task. However, we observed similar difficulties at similar moves in our healthy participants, mainly as they solved the first training problem. A situated way to interpret these difficulties is as reflecting a transient fixedness in interpreting the functions of puzzle objects. Early in an experimental session, after participants first experience the task constraintsthat only the top disk on a peg can be moved and that larger disks cannot be placed on smaller disks-they might interpret disks in "negative" functional terms, as objects that block the movement of other disks. Later in a session, once participants have learned the task, we assume that they interpret the just-displaced disk, for example, in more "positive" terms, as the destination for the largest disk of a newly recognized tower. Thus, successful performance may depend on a shift in how disks are "seen." A similar shift is needed for the peg holding the final tower of a problem; it takes a kind of insight to see that this can serve as a temporary holder of other disks before the largest disk can be moved there. Evidence for this shift can be found in Anzai and Simon's (1979) protocol data, which contain the passage, "I wonder if I've found something new . . . C will be used often before 5 gets there." Perhaps, then, patients suffer a less transient functional fixedness that interferes with their ability to see task-relevant objects in the appropriate light. Goel and Grafman's (1995) goal-conflict account can also be tested using behavioral measures. If patients have difficulty inhibiting prepotent responses and therefore act impulsively, as Goel and Grafman proposed, then response latencies for patient groups should be faster than response latencies for control groups. However, Rushe et al. (1999) found that response latencies for frontal lobe patients were not faster than those of controls. They also reported that the effect of goal conflict on a particular move disappeared after just four trials, even in patients, a pattern they interpreted as a practice effect. These two pieces of evidence suggest that the processes involved in resolving a goal conflict differ from the inhibitory processes needed in the antisaccade and Stroop tasks. It is difficult to compare Rushe et al.'s results directly with Goel and Grafman's results because of differences in methodology; for example, Rushe et al. used only a composite perfor-mance score (which included speed, error measures, problem difficulty, etc.), rather than considering speed and accuracy separately. Nonetheless, it seems that deficits in the ability to restructure how objects are perceived is one way that higher level deficits in Tower of Hanoi performance could arise.
Our model suggests other possible low-level factors that may contribute to higher level deficits. For example, in solving the puzzle, it helps to have some kind of conceptual representation of the idea that towers need to be transferred from peg to peg (Anzai & Simon, 1979) , but how is this representation acquired? One possibility is that acquisition depends on sustained attention to the set of disks making up a tower as they are transferred from peg to peg. For example, when a new tower is attended, each of its constituent disks may share the identity of being a part of that tower. As that tower is being moved, its disks are distributed across several pegs but may still have the indexes attached to them, consistent with the multiple-object tracking functionality of FINSTs (Pylyshyn, 2000) . When the disks finally come together again as a tower on a destination peg, this would support acquisition of a conceptual representation indicating that a specific tower had just been transferred from one peg to another. In terms of a recent theory of skill acquisition (Taatgen, Huss, Dickison, & Anderson, 2008) , the tower before the move and the tower after the move would represent the preconditions and postconditions, respectively, of a to-be-learned rule. However, if a patient is unable to assign indexes to objects, or to properly track the disks across time and location, then what he or she would perceive is not a tower being transferred but individual disks being moved around. Thus, a low-level attentional deficit could, in principle, lead to a high-level deficit in terms of which rules were learned.
Another low-level deficit that could contribute to high-level deficits could be a difficulty in acquiring specifically either explicit or implicit knowledge and in knowing when to rely on which. People seem to acquire implicit and explicit knowledge in parallel, and separating the contributions of each to performance is not trivial (Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998 ). Yet informal analysis suggests that some moves in the Tower of Hanoi can probably be made on the basis of implicit knowledge. This could include the "don't-undo" and "1-follows-2" heuristics that we carried over here from previous models (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2002) . People with deficits in acquisition of implicit knowledge may need to rely on more effortful processes, such as use of the goal-recursive algorithm, to make such moves correctly. This effortful, elaborate processing could, in turn, interfere with acquisition of control routines like recognizedisplace-compute (Sweller, 1988) . Conversely, people with deficits affecting how they acquire explicit knowledge may not be able to acquire the goal-recursive algorithm, for example, and thus may have to rely on implicit representations, which alone are insufficient for correct performance. Performance deficits could conceivably also stem from difficulties determining when implicit representations are insufficient and thus when to turn to explicit knowledge instead.
These analyses, although speculative, suggest that it is crucial to identify what elementary processes are engaged on a moment-by-moment basis during complex performance. The tradition has been to interpret Tower of Hanoi performance in terms of a unitary ability to create and follow plans, which is a case of defining cognitive abilities in terms of tasks rather than underlying mechanisms (see also Feinberg & Farah, 2006) . However, there has been a shift toward analyzing Tower of Hanoi performance in terms of multiple elementary cognitive processes, such as working memory (e.g., Goel, Pullara, & Grafman, 2001; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000; Morris, Miotto, Feigenbaum, Bullock, & Polkey, 1997; Numminen, Lehto, & Ruoppila, 2001 ). This shift has driven methodological changes in which coarse performance measures, such as total time per solution and total number of moves deviating from the optimal path (e.g., Owen, Doyon, Petrides, & Evans, 1996; Ward & Allport, 1997) , have been replaced with move-by-move measures that allow better measurement of processes like memory retrieval (e.g., Anderson, Albert, & Fincham, 2005) . The present study contributes to this shift, focusing on perceptual and attentional processes and the role of abstract routines that organize cognitive operations and actions on the environment. The associated methodological development was to introduce the use of saccade-contingent display changes to probe the contents of participants' problem representations.
Conclusions
In this study, we examined performance in a domain that traditionally has been analyzed in terms of plans-sequences of goals stored in and retrieved from memory-and showed that they actually make incorrect behavioral predictions. We propose that the functionality that has been attributed to plans in previous models can come from relatively simple and abstract rule-based representations interacting with the environment through perception and attention. This work takes a new step in an evolution of theorizing about goal-directed behavior that has led from architectural constructs dedicated to goals (Anderson et al., 1993; Newell & Simon, 1972) to ordered sequences of goals represented in declarative memory (Anderson & Douglass, 2001) , to sequencing of goal retrievals through environmental cues and cue-selection heuristics (Altmann & Trafton, 2002) , and now to the functionality of goals themselves being replaced by situated control routines. Whether plans can similarly be eliminated from other accounts of behavior traditionally viewed as planful remains to be seen. In the interim, we have illustrated some implications of this work for interpretation of everyday task performance and for neuropsychology, offering a reanalysis of a popular diagnostic task on the level of more elementary cognitive processes. Figure A1 shows a trace of the model running through the first 32 moves of a six-disk problem (there are 63 moves total). In this particular problem, all disks are on Peg A in the initial state and on Peg C in the final state. The first column of the trace shows the move number. The second column shows the move itself-on Move 1, for example, "1AB" means that Disk 1 was moved from Peg A to Peg B-followed by the resulting state, with the disks on a peg shown in parentheses and a peg without disks identified as "0." The third column shows the simulated latency for that move. The fourth column gives some details of the internal processing leading up to that move. For example, in the processing leading up to Move 4, the system recognized the new tower t83 that was completed on Move 3 (Disks 1 and 2 on Peg C). Recognizing this new tower triggered displacing a disk from the old tower, specifically Disk 3 from what remains of the initial tower t82 on Peg A. The simulation's performance is coordinated by the recognize-displace-compute routine, which has a number of parameters that are bound by perceptual and attentional operations. When these parameters are bound, the routine executes, which changes the world so as to create a new set of bindings that cause it to execute again, and so on. In the following, we characterize this routine in a "production rule" format and then describe it clause by clause:
Model Mechanisms
recognize-displace-compute when perception recognizes a new tower, then displace a disk from the old tower to the empty peg, apply goal-recursion to the new tower to find where to move Disk 1, move Disk 1, move Disk 2 to the other peg, and move Disk 1 to Disk 2 Perception recognizes a new tower whenever Disk 1 is placed on Disk 2 (although the tower itself may extend to larger disks; see Figure 2 ). This recognition is a signal to "displace" a disk from an old tower (old towers are described in more detail below) to the empty peg. The empty peg is effectively the peg that was cleared by assembling the new tower; if it is not physically empty, then it is subjectively empty (we would say), because any disks it holds belong to neither the new tower that was just recognized nor the old tower from which a disk is being displaced, so at this point, they are not selected for attention. When the disk from the old tower is displaced, it remains selected for attention in its new location, indexed as the just-displaced disk. The goal-recursion algorithm then starts, taking the just-displaced disk as the destination for the largest disk of the new tower and recursing up the new tower until it determines the destination for Disk 1. Disk 1 is then moved to that destination, after which two additional moves are made on the basis of heuristics carried over from previous models (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2002) , and for which we found some evidence in Experiment 3 (in the three-move error sequences that some participants made repeatedly). Thus, recognize-displacecompute triggers a three-move sequence, the effect of which is to transfer a two-disk tower (Disks 1 and 2) from the top of the new tower to another peg.
The heuristics governing the second and third moves of this three-move sequence are not core assumptions of the model, which finds the same solution path if they are omitted such that recognize-displace-compute triggers only the first move of the sequence. The only processing differences in this alternative version are that recognize-displace-compute applies on every second move, rather than on every fourth move (as in the trace in Figure  A1 ) and that to apply on the additional moves, it must consider Disk 1 by itself to be a "tower," rather than requiring a tower to include at least Disk 2.
The parameters of the recognize-displace-compute routine are bound by attentional indexes. There is one such index for the new tower, one or two indexes for old towers, and one for the justdisplaced disk. We interpret an index as a pointer to an objecteither a tower, or the just-displaced disk. We assume that tower objects in particular are disjoint, such that any disks included in a new tower when it is recognized lose their association with any old tower. Thus, as an old tower is disassembled, it shrinks; when the last disk of that tower is displaced, the pointer to that object is de-allocated, and that tower is no longer represented in the system. In the actual implementation, a tower is a unique symbol assigned to each disk in the tower (e.g., "t83" from earlier). A disk can be assigned at most one tower, so when a disk is assigned a new tower, one fewer disk is assigned the old tower (the tower "shrinks"). When a tower symbol is assigned to no disks, it is de-allocated (erased from the system).
We noted in passing above that there can sometimes be two old towers, rather than just one. An example occurs on Move 12 of the trace in Figure A1 . One old tower at this point is t84 on Peg B, which contains only one remaining disk (Disk 3). The other old tower at this point is t82 on Peg A, which is the remnant of the tower from the initial state of the problem (Disks 5 and 6). On such moves, only one old tower (t84 in this case) can ever be displaced from, because moves from the other old tower are always blocked in some way, so no additional heuristic knowledge is necessary to select one old tower over another. However, we do assume that only the tower with the displaceable disk, which is always the most recent old tower and is also always the old tower with the smaller disk, is indexed for purposes of computing the empty peg.
This implementation of indexes seems not to stretch available estimates of indexes as a resource. The model needs at most four indexes at once-the new tower, two old towers, and the justdisplaced disk-and estimates from multiple object tracking studies suggest there are four or five (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2000) . Nonetheless, the question of what limits there might be on availability of indexes in routine behavior, in which the control representations parameterized by indexes may be quite different and much richer than in multiple-object tracking, would be a relevant question to pursue in future studies. Figure A2 plots the simulated response latencies from Figure A1 against empirical response latencies for the control problems of Experiment 1. We estimated three parameter values to fit the data. Figure A1 . Trace output from the selective-attention simulation for the first 32 moves of a six-disk problem (which has 63 moves total). In the initial state (before Move 1), all disks were on Peg A, and in the final state, all disks will be on Peg C.
Model Fits to Response Latencies
(Appendix continues)
The first is the time for one recursion of the goal-recursive algorithm, estimated to be 1,328 ms. This time is charged to goalrecursion moves (1, 5, 9, . . .), multiplied in each case by the number of recursions needed for the tower on that move (five for Move 1, one for Move 5, two for Move 9, . . .). In terms of human performance, this time has to accommodate an eye movement to a disk and then another eye movement to its target peg (see Figure 1 for sample eye movements). The second parameter value is the time to select and move a disk, estimated to be 1,231 ms. This time is charged to every move, including goal-recursion moves, and in terms of human performance has to accommodate a mouse movement to the to-be-moved disk followed by a mouse movement to the target peg. The third parameter value was time to recognize a new tower and then attend to an old tower from which to displace a disk, estimated to be 539 ms. This time is charged to Move 1 and to all moves before goal-recursion moves (1, 4, 8, . . .) . This third parameter is the only one specific to the selectiveattention model; the others have to be estimated for plan-based models also. The estimate for this parameter, of about half a second, seems in accord with the perceptual and attentional operations we posit on these moves (recognizing a new tower and attending an old one, respectively), although this is at best a qualitative assessment. In more quantitative terms, excluding this parameter degrades the fit of the model. With the parameter, root-mean-squared deviation is 402 ms; with only the first and second parameters, root-mean-squared deviation for the best fit is 469 ms. A spreadsheet showing both fits, which is also what we used to estimate the parameters we then set in the simulation, is available with the other online materials at the previously mentioned URL. 
